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THE "FOURTH DEGREE": THE LIE DETECTOR
JACK STREETER* AND MELVIN M. BELLIt
Some police departments substitute for evidence the "third degree." It
is illegal. Law courts could now supplement oral evidence with a "fourth
degree"--the lie detector. It should be legal, when properly operated, when
its results are properly introduced and weighed.
Any symposium on evidence ought to include some observations on cross-
examination. A 'consideration of the instruments employalle in the art of
cross-examination should, of course, include a discussion of the instrument,
the accepted use of which, some lawyers, and certainly the average layman,
believe would make cross-examination unnecessary as to credibility.
The best legally available "lie detector" presently is a thorough and search-
ing cross-examination by adept counsel. Most experienced trial judges, there-
fore, do not attempt to curb relevant cross-examination, although some
argumentative and emphatic leading questions are accepted tools of the trade.
.In an age of startling scientific discoveries, are other methods now employ-
able to elicit truth rather than a method dependent upon forensic testimonial
credibility? The lawyer must admit, as the layman often to his sorrow has
experienced, that cross-examination is not a precisely measurable or scien-
tifically accurate operation. It is not comparable to the preciseness of an engi-
neer's me asurements or a navigator's calculations, or even the surgeon's
excision of a malignant growth. The efficacy of its very procedure is dependent
upon the vagaries of emotion, personality, fright, surprise, mnemonic capacity,
and the whimseys of the court's humor. An inaccurate, and certainly an unscien-
tific, result is often obtained. It may well be that fright, rather than mendacity,
precludes the truth.
If there were a precise means of determining truth, man might abandon his
courts, his judges and his cross-examination. How nice it would be to administer
quarter drams of "space doze" powder in a pleasant chocolate, under consti-
tutional assurances, of course, and have Professor Schwartzenhauser of the
State University assure standardized, one hundred per cent accurate results
in all cases.
Man's history abounds with methods for seeking and determining truth.
Philosophers, theologians, scientists and lawyers have sought, but never found,
a simple and efficient way to distinguish fact from fantasy. The field of law
has been especially unsuccessful in its methods. The rack, the wheel, the
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Inquisition, the third degree have all in turn been used to elicit truth.1 The
efficacy of some of these methods apparently still evokes their use abroad. But
in this country, cross-examination alone remains, with the exception perhaps
of certain metropolitan police forces who believe that the rubber hose is mightier
than the reporter's notes.2
So the scientists, combining their knowledge of physics, physiology and
psychology, have attempted to aid the law in its search for truth by developing
a machine which would record the physiological manifestations of the psycho-
logical changes which take place when a human being lies.3  These machines
are called "lie detectors."
Are they really "lie detectors"? Are they accurate? What are they and
how are the tests given? Can the results be used in court?
HISTORY OF THE "LIE DETECTOR"
All of the various types of "lie detectors" are based on the principle that
an emotional disturbance will have a physiological effect; and when an indi-
vidual consciously lies, he will be emotionally disturbed due to the fear of
detection and the "pangs of conscience."'
Subsequent to trial by ordeal, battle and torture, which undoubtedly were
considered "highly scientific" in the days of their use, came the first really
scientific attempt to determine veracity by other than natural, oral testimony
and cross-examination.
Caesare Lombroso, great Italian criminologist, (1836-1909) and founder
.of the modem science of criminology, as early as 1895 published a paper on
the results of changes in blood and blood pressure of an accused when questioned
about a crime. The basis of his method was the absence or presence of changes
in blood pressure and pulse rate when accused persons were talking about their
alleged crimes.5 Basically, this is the "lie detector" today.
1. See generally, LARsox, LYING AND ITS DarEcTIon, c. 7 (1932). Trial by battle
was made famous in Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, Scene 2.
2. "Every step in the promotion of scientific crime detection is a step toward the
abolition of the cruel and ineffective methods of establishing criminal identity, such as the
'third degree,' and also a step toward the realization of a criminal trial unhampered by
technical procedure and unreliable evidence. The use of brutality by the police in securing
confessions, the reception of flimsy testimony as to identity, and the ineffectiveness of
circumstantial evidence may be curtailed by more reliance upon scientific data and less
reliance upon individual 'reasoning.'" Baker and Inbau, The Scientific Detection of
Crime, 17 MINN. L. REv. 602, 628-29 (1933).
3. See generally on the relation of law and science, Smith, Scientific Proof, 15 RocKy
MT. L. REv. 126 (1943). See Note, 34 A.L.R. 147 (1925).
4. Floch, Limitations of the Lie Detector, 40 J. Cpau. L. & CRImINOLOGY 651 (1950)
Sell, Deception, Detection and the Law, 11 U. OF PirrT. L. Ray. 210, 214 (1950).
5. INnAU, LIE DEMrCcON AND CRmINAL INTERROGATION 2 (Zd ed. 1948); Sell,
supra note 4, at 211.
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In 1915, William Marston further developed blood pressure changes 6 and
in 1914, Vittorio Benussi, together with Marston and Lombroso, the pioneers
in this field, published a report on respiration changes as a measure of truth-
fulness. He indicated a correlation between inspiration-expiration ratio and
truth.
7
In 1921, John A. Larson completed an instrument to record simultanously
blood pressure, pulse and respiration during the entire period of interrogation. 8
In 1922, Larson reported a high percentage of accuracy.9  N,
THE APPARATUS AND THE RESULTS
In 1926, Leonarde Keeler developed what he calls the Keeler Polygraph.
It consists of a combination of instruments: the cardiograph for pulse rate,
sphygmograph for blood pressure, the pneumograph for the respiratory move-
ments, and the galvanograph to record galvanic reflexes.' 0 Keeler calls the
instrument the pneumo-cardio-sphygmogalvano-graph, for short, the poly-
graph, and he himself says it is erroneously called a "lie detector."'-
Keeler states "Almost anyone can operate a polygraph as well as he can
hear sounds through a stethoscope, but only individuals with training and long
experience can interpret the resultant recorded curves. The inexperienced
operator cannot diagnose deception with a polygraph any more than he can
diagnose a cardiac murmur with a stethoscope."'
12
Keeler believes that until competent operators are selected by examination
and licensing in a particular state and the tests placed within their exclusive
province, it should be unavailable for courtroom use.
6. Marston, Psychological Possibilities in Deception Tests, 11 J. ClUM. L. & CRIm-
INOLOGY 551 (1921); Marston, Systolic Blood Presmre Symptoms of Deception, 2 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 117 (1917).
7. Benussi, die Alnungsymptome der Luge, 31 ARcfv FUR DER GESAMTE PSYCHOLOGIE
244 (1914) ; INBAU, op. cit. supra note 5, at 3; Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29
J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 848, 870 (1939).
8. Larson, Modification of the Marston Deception Test, 12 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
390 (1921) ; Larson, The Cardio-Pneumo-Psychogram and Its Use in the Study of EBno-
tions with Practical Application, 5 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 323 (1922) ; Larson,
The Cardio-Pnetino-Psychogram in Deception, 6 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 420
(1923).
9. Larson, The Berkeley Lie Detector and Other Deception Tests, 47 A.B.A. REP.
619 (1922).
10. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, II. Methods of Detecting Decep-
tion, 24 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1140 (1934) ; Sell, supra note 4, at 212.
11. "To begin with, there is no such thing as a 'lie-detector.' There ate no instru-
ments recording bodily changes, such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, or galvanic
reflex, that deserve the name 'lie-detector' any more than a stethoscope, a clinical ther-
mometer, or a blood count apparatus with a microscope can be called an 'appendicitis
detector.' However, deception, guilt or innocence can be diagnosed from symptoms just
as appendicitis, paranoia, or any other physical or mental disorder can be diagnosed."
Keeler, Debunking the "Lie-Detector;" 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1934).
12. Id. at 159.
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In the field of "lie detection," as in the whole field of medicine, mistakes
are made that are inexplicable. Nature often plays havoc with diagnosis and
prognosis, in the medical consultation room. No two human beings are alike.
Of the trillions and trillions of leaves, none have the same identical pattern.
However, there is sufficient uniformity of subject matter and result now to
surmise that, with competent operators, the lie detection test is perhaps more
accurate, more fair than cross-examination.
Seventy-five per cent of the people questioned on the lie detector by Keeler
have confessed.' 3 Compare this with the courtroom record of the witnesses
every lawyer has met that he knows without doubt are lying, yet there is no
confession of mendacity.
Electro-cardiographs, electro-encephalograms, and electro-myelographs have
been allowed in court, 14 yet medical men now agree that their results are far
less certain than the accuracy of the polygraph and their workings much less
understood.
Remarkably dramatic "lie detector" results are familiar to everyone from
accounts in the popular magazines. A card player is told to choose a card
from the deck. The polygraph operator tells him to answer "no" to every card
he calls, even though it is the card he chooses. The almost imperceptible change
in the subject's physiology when he "lies" in answering "no" to the true card
enables the operator to determine the name of that card.
The fact that the subject may be extremely nervous, may be sluggish, or may
be of a different personality than the previous person examined is no problem
at all to the trained operator. Trial examinations to determine the norm level
out the subject.15 The operator learns certain questions to pose, determines
certain results just as the X-ray technician, the encephalographer, the electro-
cardiographer. "Even though little is known of these mental processes in
deception, diagnosis is still possible by recognition of the products of the
processes, just as insanity can be diagnosed from symptoms although the basic
mental processes are unknown; or cancer can be diagnosed, although the cause
fo the disease is still a mystery.'
6
The lie detector thus does scientifically what the able cross-examiner may
often ascertain for himself: Experienced cross-examiners determine little
storm signs in the witness that indicate truth or lying. Judge Lowell thought
that he had an infallible lie detector when he advised the jury that "You can
13. See Inbau, The Lie-Detectm, 26 B.U.L. Rzv. 264, 268 (1946).
14. See generally, Riseman, Principles of Electrocardiography, 15 RocKY MT. L. REV.
236 (1943); Smith and Riseman, Applied Use of the Electrocardiogram it; Legal Pro-
ceedings, 15 RocKY MT. L. REv. 251 (1943).
15. Sell, supra note 4, at 214.
16. Keeler, supra note 11, at 155.
[ VOL . 5
LIE DETECTOR
determine when a man is lying by his wiping his hands together and sweating."
This case was reversed. Judge Lowell's lie detector was not determined to
be sufficiently scientific by the appellate court.
17
Although no one claims 100% infallibility for the lie detector, i.e., the
polygraph, Inbau makes the following estimate based on the experience of
the Chicago Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory: (1) the examiner can.
make a definite and accurate diagnosis in 75% of the cases; (2) the record
will be too indefinite in its indications to permit a definite diagnosis in 20% of
the cases; (3) the margin of probable error is 5%0.18 Another experiment,
which attempted to distinguish between actual guilt of crime and mere guilty
knowledge, reports 86% accuracy.19
RESULTS AS EVIDENCE
The courts have shown great reluctance in recognizing the endeavors of
the men of science. This reluctance has led to their holding the results of lie
detector tests inadmissable.
A survey of the cases in this field, both reported and unreported, leads to
the conclusion that there are three distinct lines of authority.
1. One line of cases refuses to admit the results of lie detector tests because
the method has not achieved sufficient standing or scientific recognition.20
2. A second line of cases recognizes that there might be validity to such
tests, and therefore will probably admit them with a sufficient foundational
showing of validity.
21
3. A third line of cases will admit the results of a lie detector upon stipula-
tion of the parties.
22
17. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 Sup. Ct. 698, 77 L. Ed. 1321 (1933).
This decision reversed the court of appeals, 62 F.2d 746 (1st Cir. 1933), which had
affirmed the trial court.
18. Inbau, supra note 13, at 268.
19. Baesen, Chung, and Yang, A Lie-Detector Experinent, 39 J. CiRi. L. & Cium-
INOLOGY 532 (1948).
20. See Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; People v. Wochnick,
98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (1950) ; State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43
(1945) ; Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wris. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943); State v. Bohmer, 210
Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
21. People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); Boeche v. State 151
Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ; People v. Forte, 277 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938)
("We cannot take judicial notice that this instrument is or is not effective for the purpose
of determining the truth"); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Co. Ct.
1938) ; unreported case in Indianapolis in 1924, RiCHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed.
1940). The first civil case to consider the problem, Stone v. Earp, 50 N.W.2d 172
(Mich. 1951) followed People v. Becker, supra. Wigmore is in accord with this view,
3 WI GmORE, EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940).
22. State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147, 149 (1947) ; State v. Loniello (1935),
State v. Rowe (1936), and State v. Conn (1941), three unreported Wisconsin cases
described in 1943 Wis. L. Ri,. 430, 435.
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Although the decisions do seem to fall into the pattern outlined above, it
should be noted that there is very little authority in this field. Moreover, only
one reported case has admitted the results of a lie detector examination without
a stipulation.23
Prior to Stone v. Ear p,24 decided by the Michigan Supreme Court in
December 1951, all the decisions which had considered this problem had been
criminal cases. As pointed out by the Michigan Court, the introduction of lie
detector results in civil cases does not present any greater or different problems
than it presents in the criminal courts. In fact, if the admissibility of the lie
detector is ever fully accepted in criminal cases, it should follow a fortiori that
it is admissible in a civil action as there is no problem of self-incrimination.25
The main objection enunciated by the courts to the admission of lie detector
examinations has been the alleged lack of scientific recognition, and the doubt
in the validity of the diagnosis.20  Since the purpose of such a test is to get
at the truth, a pertinent inquiry is whether the accepted methods can be shown
to have greater validity.
The average witness steps into court afraid and confused. He is subjected
to endless questioning. The cross-examiner sets traps for him, leads him,
confuses him, and plays on his fear and confusion. The opposing attorneys
sometimes question the witness not with the purpose of getting the exact and
complete truth, but with the purpose of leading or trapping the witness into
making statements favorable to their side. Or if he has given damaging testi-
mony, the attorney attempts to impeach him by casting doubt upon his character
and veracity. The judges and juries habitually and with sanction of law con-
sider and give weight to their interpretation of the witness' demeanor and the
changes of appearance, expression, voice, respiration, etc., in passing judgment
upon the truth or falsity of his testimony. Obviously, such an interpretation
must be a crude and inaccurate one.
2 7
23. People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Co. Ct. 1938), admitted the
results of a pathometer test conducted by Father Summers of Fordham University. For
a discussion of pathometer see Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FoRD. L. REv.
334 (1939).
24. 50 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1951). The trial court admitted the results of a lie
aetector test, on stipulation of the parties; the Michigan Supreme Court held this to be
error but not prejudicial because the results favored the defendant, and the plaintiff had
failed to sustain his burden of proof.
25. See generally, Sell, sup4ra note 4, at 224.
26. "We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made." Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). "The systolic blood pressure deception test for determining the
truthfulness of testimony has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition as
to justify the admission of expert testimony deduced from tests made under such theory."
People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App.2d 124, 219 P.2d 70, 72 (1950).
27. McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 484,
485 (1927).
[ VoL. 5% 554
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Contrast with this crude and at times barbaric procedure, the scientific
method.28 The witness is questioned by a trained and disinterested examiner.
A norm is established for the witness' reactions. Then the physiological and
psychological reactions which the judge and jury attempt to observe and inter-
pret are scientifically and accurately recorded and interpreted by an expert.
Even though the lie detector is not 100% accurate, there can be no doubt that
it is more efficient and accurate than our presently accepted method of eliciting
the facts.
In considering the problem of lack of scientific recognition, McCormick
reports sending out questionnaires, in 1927, to 88 members of the American
Psychological Association. The question asked was whether deception tests
measuring reaction time, respiratory changes and blood pressure changes furnish
results of sufficient accuracy to warrant consideration by judges and jurors.
Of the replies received: (1) 18 answered "yes" with varying qualifications;
(2) 13 answered "no"; (3) 7 were of doubtful classification. Not more than
7 of the replies could properly be interpreted as indicating lack of belief in the
substantial value of the tests for any purpose.2 9 At present the results would
undoubtedly be more favorable, because there have been 25 years of further
experimentation and improvement in the apparatus and technique.3 0 But even
the results received in 1927 indicate a better than 50% acceptance by psychol-
ogistsYl
A further objection has been made that the lie detector would impair the
right of cross-examination. This objection is based on a misconception 'of the
method of examination. The machine record s physiological changes and does
so accurately. No one denies this. In this respect it is \exactly like other
machines whose results are admitted in evidence, e.g., cameras, X-ray machines,
28. "For hundreds of years our courts have deemed the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses in open court to be the best method so far devised for the
ascertainment of the truth and have used that method for lack of any better approach.
It seems to me that this pathometer and the technique by which it is used indicate a
new and more scientific approach to the ascertainment of truth in legal investigations."
People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (Co. Ct. 1938).
29. See McCormick, supra note 27, at 495-97.
30. See Reid, Simulated Blood Pressure Responses in Lie-Detector Tests and a
Method for Their Detection, 36 J. CR1r. L. & CRIumINOLoGY, 201 (1945) ; Reid, A Revised
Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests, 37 J. Cmrtm. L. & CRNTIlNOLOGY 542 (1947).
31. "The comments of some legal writers seem tacitly to assume that the deception
tests must be shown not only to be scientifically accepted as evidential or significant, but
that they must be demonstrated to be error-proof. But it is apparent that no capacity
for anything like a hundred per cent correctness of results is required. The emotional
curve is to be admitted merely as circumstantial evidence of a truthful intent or the
reverse. If the test results are shown by scientific experience to render the inferences
of consciousness of falsity or truth substantially more probable, then the courts should
accept the evidence, though the possibility of error in the inference be recognized. The
admission of evidence that blood-hounds have followed a trail from the crime to the
whereabouts of the accused, of evidence of similarity of foot-marks, and of conduct to
show insanity, are all striking examples of the fact that conclusiveness in the inference
called for by the evidence is not a requirement for admissibility." McCormick, Deception
Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. R.E%. 484, 500 (1927).
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sphygmomanometer, electrocardiogram, etc. The lie detector does not impair
the right of cross-examination any more than do these other instruments.
The results of the lie detector test are of no value to the judge or jury until
interpreted by the expert. In the same way, the X-rays, electrocardiograms or
symptoms of the disease are of no value until interpreted by the radiologist,
cardiologist or doctor. It is at this point that the opposing party is entitled
to cross-examination. He may cross-examine the expert on his diagnosis and
the reasons therefor.
It has also been suggested that to subject witnesses to a lie detector examina-
tion unwillingly borders on the inquisitorial. This is an untenable argument
based on the assumption that the witness has a right to lie. Inquisitorial methods
seek to force a confession through torture and duress. The third degree used
with such success by some police forces is an example of an inquisitorial method.
When taking a lie detector examination, the witness is not forced to answer
questions, nor is he subjected to prolonged questioning without food or drink.
The only purpose of the examination is to determine if the witness is consciously
lying. To say that this is inquisitorial is to say that a witness has a right to
deceive the court and the jury, and to force them to rely on crude and inaccurate
methods in evaluating his testimony.
The weight to be given to the examiner's diagnosis is for the jury to deter-
mine. They may accept it, disregard it, or give it merely partial consideration.
It is just another type of expert testimony to aid the jury in making its deter-
mination of the facts, but in no way does the polygraph invade the province
of the jury.
32
One of the most difficult tasks in our entire judicial procedure is that of
the jury in its deliberations. It is for this group of 12 untrained laymen to weigh
and evaluate all the conflicting evidence and testimony, then decide what are
the actual facts. If the jury can be informed by experts that certain witnesses
are lying while others are telling the truth, this tremendous task would, of
course, be immeasurably lessened, although the ultimate fact finding function
would still be left in the hands of the jurors.
In order to make the jury aware of exactly how they are to deal with the
testimony of an expert who has administered a lie-detector examination, the
court must instruct the jury on its exact function. The following instruction
was given by a trial judge in State v. Loniello and Grignaro, an unreported
Wisconsin case:
32. "Both upon legal principle and sound reasoning, it would seem that the courts if
willing to accept and receive handwriting testimony, psychiatric testimony, and other
such expert opinion, should also admit in evidence testimony of the pathometer test and
the results disclosed thereby when a proper foundation has been laid therefor." People
v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (Co. Ct. 1938).
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"Previous to this trial, each defendant submitted himself to an examination by the
Keeler Polygraph. This examination was conducted by Leonarde Keeler, at Portage,
Wisconsin, by a proper stipulation between tle State and the defendants, and Mr. Keeler
was permitted to tell you the results of the examination in question. This testimony
does not tend to show or prove any element of the crime charged. It at mnost andc
best only tends to show that at the time of the examination of the defendants they were
not telling the truth. Now, Mfembers of the Jury, it is for you to give it such corrobora-
tory weight and effect as you think it fairly and reasonably entitled to receive."
It must be admitted that the lie detector is not a complete remedy for the
ills of false testimony.' 4  Quite often a witness, because of a lapse of time,
the excitement of the incident testified about, or poor memory, gives false
testimony without consciously lying. The lie detector will not detect that the
testimony of this type of witness is false, because the witness does not have
the emotional disturbance caused by fear of detection and therefore the physio-
logical manifestations of lying are not present.
This presents somewhat of an obstacle. Although the same problem of
unconscious lying appears under our present system, with a lie detector diagnosis
of truth, or at least no conscious lying, the jury is likely to be unduly impressed.
This problem does not preclude the admission of lie detector examination. A
similar obstacle is presented by blood grouping tests in paternity suits. A blood
grouping test can conclusively establish that a man is not the parent of a child;
however, it cannot prove that he is, merely that he might be.35 Similarly, the
polygraph can establish that a witness is lying, but cannot prove that he is
telling the truth, but only that he is telling what he believes to be the truth.
It would be the duty of- the court to instruct the jury on the possibility of
unconscious lying, and the weight to be given a diagnosis of truth. The
following instruction is suggested for that purpose:
"The theory of the lie detector is that it records the physiological manifestations
of the emotional disturbance caused by consciously lying. It is possible that a witness
may give false testimony, but because of poor memory, lapse of time or the excitement
of the occasion, be unaware of the fact that his testimony is false. In such a situation
the lie detector will not detect the untruth. Therefore, I must admonish you not to
give undue weight to a diagnosis of truth, but to realize that the witness may be
unconsciously lying. It is for you, the jury, after considering the witness' demeanor,
the entire testimony, and all the evidence, to ultimately determine the truth or falsity
of the testimony."
If the results of lie detector examinations are to be admitted in evidence
in civil cases, there should be restrictions imposed to avoid abuse of this instru-
33. Quoted in Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique Admitted in Evidence, 26 J.
CR M. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 262, 268 (1935) (emphasis added).
34. See generally, Floch, supra note 4.
35. Hooker and Boyd, Blood-Grouping as a Test of Non-Paternity, 25 J. CRIa. L. &
CRMrINOLOGY 187 (1934) ; Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 277 (1951).
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ment. The most important restriction is that the examination should be admitted
only when given by a trained examiner.30 This examination is based upon
delicate physiological reactions, which can be interpreted only by one who
,understands and is trained in the interpretation of them. To make certain of
the accuracy of the diagnosis, the examination should be administered only
by persons licensed by the State Board of Iedical Examiners.
Whether the lie detector evidence should be admissible in all cases or only
upon stipulation of the parties is open to question. From a theoretical point
of view, once the validity of such tests is accepted, they should be required and
admitted in all cases. This would expedite the detection of deception, and
eliminate much of the guesswork in the fact finding process. The law moves
by small steps and not gigantic strides. At this juncture, to suggest that lie
detectors be employed in all civil cases would be to suggest that we revolutionize
entire trial procedure. It mnight be wiser, therefore, to take the small step
first and to allow the tests only when both parties agree.3
7
If one of the parties refuses to submit to a lie detector examination, both
the court and counsel should be free to comment upon this refusal, and the
jury should be allowed to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. The district
attorney in California may now comment upon a defendant's failure to testify-
i.e., present himself as a candidate for lie detection by cross-examination.
There can be no reason for refusing to take a lie detector examination, except
fear of detection. Therefore, if a party refuses to submit to such an examination,
it seems reasonable to doubt his testimony, and his refusal is a fact which will
aid the jury in evaluating the witness and his testimony.
It must be concluded that the time has come when courts should recognize
more advances made by science. The "triers of facts," attempting to arrive
at the truth, should find no justification in not using the most scientific and
accurate method devised by man.
CONCLUSION
1. Experience with both the pseudo-scientific "lie detectors" and the scien-
tific "lie detector" is much more general and historical than commonly realized.
2. The lie detector is not infallible, but it is much more accurate than other
scientific and medical tests, the results of which are allowed in evidence.
36. Inbau, Some Avoidable Lie-Detector Mistakes, 40 J. CaRI. L. & CRIIINOLOGY
791 (1950) ; Trovillo, Deception Test Criteria, 33 J. CaIznt. L. & CRI.\INOLOGY 338 (1942).
37. This is the position which appears to be taken by Wigmore, although lie would
seem to limit the use of lie-detectors to criminal cases. "The record of blood-pressure
variations of an accused person, made during an interrogation while voluntarily submitting
to the application of suitable apparatus (polygraph, electrocardiograph, "lie-detector"),
is admissible, either to corroborate or to discredit his testimony." WIGMoRE, CoDE OF
EVIDENCE § 967 (3d ed. 1942) (emphasis added).
[ VoiL. 5
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3. The lie detector has been used principally in criminal investigation. It is
available likewise in civil disputes and its results should be employable by the
triers of fact under proper instructions.
4. Generally, the results of the most scientific instrument of "lie detection"
are not legally available except by stipulation. It should not be misconduct
to ask a witness if he will submit to a lie detector, properly operated.
5. The lie detector is valueless without a competent operator.
6. The lie detector cannot supplant cross-examination, nor should it substi-
tute for jury deliberation. It is, however, an adjunct to determine truth, not
advantageously employed under present day trial methods.
